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Board and Monitoring Committee Independence

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  • Julie Cotter
  • Mark Silvester

Abstract

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors and their monitoring committees (audit and compensation) for large Australian companies. For firms whose boards use a committee structure, much of the monitoring responsibility of the board is expected to rest with the independent committee members. We document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on the full board and its monitoring committees, and a greater proportion of independent directors on both audit and compensation committees than the full board. Our hypotheses tests involve an examination of the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflicts on full board and committee independence, and the association between this independence and firm value. We find that full board independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Audit committee independence is associated with reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage is low. While we predict a positive relationship between board and monitoring committee independence and firm value, our results do not support this conjecture.

Suggested Citation

  • Julie Cotter & Mark Silvester, 2003. "Board and Monitoring Committee Independence," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 39(2), pages 211-232, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:39:y:2003:i:2:p:211-232
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6281.00127
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    3. Anderson, Don & Francis, Jere R. & Stokes, Donald J., 1993. "Auditing, directorships and the demand for monitoring," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 353-375.
    4. Mary E. Barth & Sanjay Kallapur, 1996. "The Effects of Cross†Sectional Scale Differences on Regression Results in Empirical Accounting Research," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 527-567, September.
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