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Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints

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  • Dilawar Ahmad Bhat

  • Udayan Chanda

  • Anil K. Bhat

Abstract

This paper analyses the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the Indian banking system from the perspective of soft budget constraints. Using a panel dataset of 105 publicly listed firms, it explores the relationship between NPAs and bank lending behaviour, particularly examining credit rationing regarding firm size and risk level. The findings indicate that Indian banks favour large firms over smaller ones, while credit rationing is not adequately aligned with borrower riskiness. However, the Asset Quality Review (AQR) by the Reserve Bank of India and the introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) seem to have enforced risk-based lending to some extent. These results shed light on the systemic issues that drive NPAs, linking them to governance weaknesses and the prevalence of soft budget constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilawar Ahmad Bhat & Udayan Chanda & Anil K. Bhat, 2024. "Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints," Modern Finance, Modern Finance Institute, vol. 2(2), pages 161-171.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdy:modfin:v:2:y:2024:i:2:p:161-171:id:196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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