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Estimation of Antitrust Policy Efficiency by Diffusion Markers on The Example of The State Purchase System

Author

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  • Azat R. Safiullin*

    (Kazan Federal University, Russia)

  • Timur Ai. Mezentsev

    (Kazan Federal University, Russia)

  • Amir M. Safiullin

    (Kazan Federal University, Russia)

Abstract

A sustainable development of the sectoral markets should be viewed through the prism of market structure types and the factors of their management. The difference of market structure types requires different instruments of competition policy, which is a set of consistent measures implemented by state in order to ensure the conditions for the competitiveness of economic entities, the increase of Russian economy efficiency and competitiveness, the modernization of enterprises and the creation of conditions to ensure citizen needs in goods services by cost-effective way. The article analyzed the problems of violation determination in the course of public procurement. The aim of the work is to develop an approach to the monitoring of procurement procedure correctness. In the course of the study, the regulatory framework was analyzed in the field of public procurement, as well as the most frequent violations encountered in procurement activities. The result of the work is the development of an approach to monitor the procurement activities based on deviation markers, which can be used as the tool for the initial identification of suspicious transactions by state and municipal authorities. The article was prepared within the framework of the scientific project No. 16-06-00062 supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research.

Suggested Citation

  • Azat R. Safiullin* & Timur Ai. Mezentsev & Amir M. Safiullin, 2018. "Estimation of Antitrust Policy Efficiency by Diffusion Markers on The Example of The State Purchase System," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, pages 112-116:5.
    • Handle: RePEc:arp:tjssrr:2018:p:112-116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Mark Blaug, 2001. "Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic Efficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(1), pages 37-48, August.
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