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Choosing a Field of Education: Signaling, Mismatch, and Equilibrium Shifting

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  • Joanna Franaszek

Abstract

In this paper the author reviews a well-known model of job market signaling through education, extending it to a choice of a field of study. In the theoretical part, she extends the classic model, by analyzing a game of education choice with continuum types of agents and discrete space of efforts, which is here interpreted as a field of study at the university level. In the second part, the author provides a simple numerical exercise to show how policy changes may influence the equilibrium. This exercise is used in the context of observed overeducation in the Polish labor market. Given the data on recent alumni’s field of study and professional career, the author calibrates a stylized disutility function that would rationalize the choices within a signaling model with inelastic demand and some unobserved frictions. Then, she provides a simple illustrative argument on how an intervention by a better-informed social planner may shift the equilibrium. The author argues that overeducation may arise if the cost of getting a diploma is too small; this can lead to an over-supply of university graduates as compared with the labor market demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Joanna Franaszek, 2022. "Choosing a Field of Education: Signaling, Mismatch, and Equilibrium Shifting," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 1, pages 94-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2022:i:1:p:94-113
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laura Ehrmantraut & Pia Pinger & Renske Stans, 2020. "The Expected (Signaling) Value of Higher Education," Working Papers 2020-070, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    2. Albert Ma, Ching-to & Weiss, Andrew M., 1993. "A signaling theory of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 135-157, January.
    3. Meroni, Elena Claudia & Vera-Toscano, Esperanza, 2017. "The persistence of overeducation among recent graduates," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 120-143.
    4. Damon Clark & Paco Martorell, 2014. "The Signaling Value of a High School Diploma," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 282-318.
    5. Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-1365, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    higher education; labor market; signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education

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