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Information Asymmetry and Credit Risk

Author

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  • Lorena TUPANGIU

    (University of Craiova)

Abstract

Information asymmetry defines relationships where an agent holds information while another does not hold it. Thus, to the extent that one of the parties to the financing agreement has information more or less accurate than another, the asymmetry of information appears to be a major constraint in the financing of a project. Banks, in their capacity of financial intermediary, operate the transfer of funds to agents in need of financing, to the borrowers, being necessary in this process to have more information in order to benefit of expertise in assessing borrowers. The research of information asymmetry and credit risk consists of interrogating the following aspects: information issues between the bank and borrowers; settlement of information issues; bank’s activism towards information asymmetry. In our approach we will look at the first aspect, namely the information issues between the bank and the borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorena TUPANGIU, 2017. "Information Asymmetry and Credit Risk," Finante - provocarile viitorului (Finance - Challenges of the Future), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(19), pages 153-157, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aio:fpvfcf:v:1:y:2017:i:19:p:153-157
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information asymmetry; credit relationship; credit risk; adverse selection; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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