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Determinants of Financial Efficiency and Performance in Big-Cap Chain Hotels

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  • Berk Yıldız

Abstract

Chain hotels with $1 billion in market capitalization not only contribute to employment creation and indirectly become a driving force in the regeneration of local economies but also play an essential role in recovering local economies with their high revenue per available room (RevPAR) values. Besides, the financial stability of these hotel chains directly influences the popularity of destinations, resulting in an influx of tourists to nearby regions, which in turn generates an economic contribution to the overall development of the tourism industry. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to determine the financial factors that are affecting the RevPAR (RPR), their role in the industry, and the validity of the agency cost theory of nine chain hotels that have at least $1 billion in market capital listed in U.S. stock markets over the period 2013–2022. The results show that, in contrast to the debt service coverage ratio, receivables turnover ratio, and book value per share variables, the day sales outstanding ratio and current ratio have a negative impact on chain hotels' RevPAR.

Suggested Citation

  • Berk Yıldız, 2024. "Determinants of Financial Efficiency and Performance in Big-Cap Chain Hotels," Journal of Research in Economics, Politics & Finance, Ersan ERSOY, vol. 9(2), pages 254-270.
    • Handle: RePEc:ahs:journl:v:9:y:2024:i:2:p:254-270
    DOI: 10.30784/epfad.1452277
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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