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Repricing of executive stock options

Author

Listed:
  • Jerry Yang

    ()

  • Willard Carleton

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerry Yang & Willard Carleton, 2011. "Repricing of executive stock options," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 459-490, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:459-490 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-010-0185-0
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    2. Acharya, Viral V. & John, Kose & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 2000. "On the optimality of resetting executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 65-101, July.
    3. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
    4. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2000. "The Taxation of Executive Compensation," NBER Chapters,in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14, pages 1-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Chia-Ying Chan & Ling-Chu Lee & Ming-Chun Wang, 2010. "Employee stock options pricing and the implication of restricted exercise price: evidence from Taiwan," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 247-271, February.
    6. repec:bla:joares:v:34:y:1996:i::p:1-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Core, John & Guay, Wayne, 1999. "The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-184, December.
    8. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
    9. Brenner, Menachem & Sundaram, Rangarajan K. & Yermack, David, 2000. "Altering the terms of executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 103-128, July.
    10. Gilson, Stuart C & Vetsuypens, Michael R, 1993. " CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 425-458, June.
    11. Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2002. "Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 145-171, June.
    12. Huddart, Steven, 1994. "Employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 207-231, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repricing; Executive stock options; Incentive contracts; Variable accounting charges; Agency costs; G30; G32; G34; G38; J33; L14;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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