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Qualité et développement territorial: une grille d'analyse théorique à partir de la rente

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  • Mollard, Amédée

Abstract

In this paper, we try to build a grid of analysis of the territorial development starting from the theory of rent. A series of criteria must be observed in reality and collected together in a synthetic matrix so that are generated various forms of rents: territorial rent due to the valorization of specific resources on certain spaces ; quality rent related to the emergence of quality products or services; rent of territorial quality, when all these elements interact. After a clarification of the contextual reasons for returning to the concept of rent and a justification of its relevance when it is applied to quality and territory, two theoretical filiations of the rent theory - the ricardian one, then the marshallian - are approached in order to show that they are complementary from the point of view of relationship between quality and territorial development and can be combined as a grid of theoretical analysis of territorial development

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  • Mollard, Amédée, 2001. "Qualité et développement territorial: une grille d'analyse théorique à partir de la rente," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 263.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:355063
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355063
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    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. François Eymard-Duvernay, 1989. "Conventions de qualité et formes de coordination," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 329-360.
    3. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, January.
    4. G. Allaire & B. Sylvander, 1997. "Qualité spécifique et systèmes d'innovation territoriale," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 44, pages 29-59.
    5. Amigues, Jean-Pierre & Desaigues, B. & Vuong, Q. H., 1996. "L'évaluation contingente : controverses et perspectives," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 39.
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