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Barrieres fiscales et commerce international: l'exemple des vins et spiritueux

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  • Arnaud, Charles
  • Giraud-Heraud, Eric
  • Hammoudi, Hakim

Abstract

The alcoholic beverage is a good example for non tariff barrier policies. In this sector, countries increase the difficulties for entrance of imported products, mostly for food safety reasons which arise from consumption of alcohol. This paper bring to light to the main role of the specific taxes for consumption, showing how an harmonization of these taxes could be accepted by different countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnaud, Charles & Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Hammoudi, Hakim, 2002. "Barrieres fiscales et commerce international: l'exemple des vins et spiritueux," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 267.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:354715
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.354715
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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