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Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Belhaj
  • Renaud Bourl?s
  • Fr?d?ric Dero?an

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Renaud Bourl?s & Fr?d?ric Dero?an, 2014. "Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 58-90, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:58-90
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.58
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre Dubois & Bruno Jullien & Thierry Magnac, 2008. "Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 679-725, July.
    2. Renaud Bourlès & Dominique Henriet, 2012. "Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 37(1), pages 27-56, March.
    3. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September.
    4. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
    5. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 97/08, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Oct 2000.
    6. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    7. Juan Carlos Hatchondo, 2008. "A quantitative study of the role of wealth inequality on asset prices," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 73-96.
    8. Manuela Angelucci & Giacomo De Giorgi, 2009. "Indirect Effects of an Aid Program: How Do Cash Transfers Affect Ineligibles' Consumption?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 486-508, March.
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    10. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2012. "Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 192-202.
    11. Gabrielle Demange, 2008. "Sharing aggregate risks under moral hazard," Working Papers halshs-00586739, HAL.
    12. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-190, March.
    13. Gabrielle Demange, 2008. "Sharing aggregate risks under moral hazard," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586739, HAL.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yan Ji, 2017. "Job Search under Debt: Aggregate Implications of Student Loans," 2017 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2012. "Ross risk vulnerability for introductions and changes in background risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 197-206.
    3. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Working Papers of BETA 2016-22, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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