Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
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- Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
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- Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Yan, Hong, 2017. "Understanding transactions prices in the credit default swaps market," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-27.
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More about this item
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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