Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ilwoo Hwang, 2013. "A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-050, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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- Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Yan, Hong, 2017. "Understanding transactions prices in the credit default swaps market," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-27.
- Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
- Hwang, Ilwoo & Li, Fei, 2017. "Transparency of outside options in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 116-147.
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- Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-504, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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- Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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