Bargaining with Deadlines
We study a dynamic model of pre-trial negotiations in which a privately-informed defendant bargains over a possible settlement offer with a plaintiff. We characterize the unique equlibrium limit of a sequence of games as the plaintiff can make more and more frequent offers and discuss under what conditions one can expect a deadline effect - i.e. a positive probability mass of agreement right before the deadline. We discuss connections to the generalized Coase Conjecture.
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|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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