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Bargaining with Deadlines


  • Andrzej Skrzypacz


  • William Fuchs

    (University of Chicago)


We study a dynamic model of pre-trial negotiations in which a privately-informed defendant bargains over a possible settlement offer with a plaintiff. We characterize the unique equlibrium limit of a sequence of games as the plaintiff can make more and more frequent offers and discuss under what conditions one can expect a deadline effect - i.e. a positive probability mass of agreement right before the deadline. We discuss connections to the generalized Coase Conjecture.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrzej Skrzypacz & William Fuchs, 2009. "Bargaining with Deadlines," 2009 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:159

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 219-243, November.
    2. Ş. Akın & Brennan Platt, 2014. "A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 101-133, January.
    3. S. Nuray Akin & Brennan C. Platt, 2011. "Searching on a Deadline," Working Papers 2011-11, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    4. Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2016. "Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    5. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2010. "Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 802-836, June.

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