IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Publisher's Announcements and Piracy-Monitoring Devices in Software Adoption

Listed author(s):
  • Eric Darmon
  • Alexandra Rufini
  • Dominique Torre

In this paper, we investigate the distribution strategy of a software publisher. The user adoption context is characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good) and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods (or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can acquire information through word-of-mouth. To maximize profit, the publisher needs to decide about price, quality and level of monitoring of piracy. We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the product. We add to the literature by explicitly considering the opportunity for the publisher to cheat about future price and monitoring levels (misleading announcements). This strategy that is falsely permissive towards piracy, can sometimes appear more profitable. However, when the degree of sophistication of user expectations about the publisher's strategy increases, only a strategy that is permissive (with respect to piracy) with non misleading announcements remains robust.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.409
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by GENES in its journal Annals Of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2014)
Issue (Month): 115-116 ()
Pages: 409-430

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:409-430
DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.409
Contact details of provider: Postal:
3, avenue Pierre Larousse, 92245 Malakoff Cedex

Phone: 01.41.17.51.55
Web page: https://annals.ensae.fr/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Eric Darmon & Alexandra Rufini & Dominique Torre, 2009. "Back to software "profitable piracy": the role of information diffusion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 543-553.
  2. Michael Stolpe, 2000. "Protection Against Software Piracy: A Study Of Technology Adoption For The Enforcement Of Intellectual Property Rights," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 25-52.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:409-430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laurent Linnemer)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.