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A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2017. "Efficient voting with penalties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 468-485.
  2. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
  3. Gordon Tullock, 1977. "The demand-revealing process as a welfare indicator," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 51-63, March.
  4. Beatrice Cherrier & Jean-Baptiste Fleury, 2017. "Economists’ interest in collective decision after World War II: a history," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 23-44, July.
  5. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
  6. A. H. Barnett, 1981. "Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods," Public Finance Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 221-234, April.
  7. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
  8. Earl Brubaker, 1983. "On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 315-319, January.
  9. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
  10. Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
  11. Robert Bordley, 1985. "Using factions to estimate preference intensity: Improving upon one person/one vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 257-268, January.
  12. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 45-73, July.
  13. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
  14. JOHN McMILLAN, 1979. "The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(2), pages 95-107, June.
  15. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 109-130, October.
  16. Martin Gaynor, 1989. "The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 261-267, June.
  17. Holcombe, Randall G. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 196-207.
  18. Arthur Schram & Frans Winden, 1989. "Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 259-282, March.
  19. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, 2017. "Gordon Tullock’s ill-fated appendix: “Flatland Revisited”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 18-34, March.
  20. T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2015. "Remembering Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 235-238, March.
  21. Bryane Michael, 2005. "The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes," Microeconomics 0511009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton & Svetlana Pevnitskaya, 2019. "A new experimental mechanism to investigate polarized demands for public goods: the effects of censoring," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 585-609, September.
  23. Gaël Giraud, 2004. "The limit-price exchange process," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04118, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  24. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 329-332, September.
  25. Don Coursey & William Schulze, 1986. "The application of laboratory experimental economics to the contingent valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 47-68, January.
  26. Eli Noam, 1982. "Demand functions and the valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 271-280, January.
  27. Steven Johnson, 1984. "Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 3-24, January.
  28. Steven Lalley & Glen Weyl, 2015. "Quadratic Voting," Working Papers 2016-13, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  29. John G. Head, 1977. "Public Goods:The Polar Case Reconsidered," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 53(2), pages 227-238, June.
  30. Michael Munger, 2012. "Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 61-72, July.
  31. T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2008. "Paying the partners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 19-37, July.
  32. T. Tideman & Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Coalitions under demand revealing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 323-328, January.
  33. T. Tideman, 1983. "An experiment in the demand-revealing process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 387-401, January.
  34. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
  35. Becker, Nir & Shechter, Mordechai, 1996. "Decentralized economic incentives under technological indivisibilities: a cooperative game approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 9-20, April.
  36. Yang, Der-Yuan, 1997. "A Mechanism for Allocating the Expenses of Public Goods: Analyses of a Swedish Government Project," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3mx5z1b4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  37. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2008. "Accurate Valuation in the Absence of Markets," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 334-358, May.
  38. Tullock Gordon, 1995. "More Impossibility," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-16, June.
  39. Matt Van Essen, 2013. "Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 57-68, May.
  40. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 47-60, July.
  41. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "Quadratic voting and the public good: introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 1-22, July.
  42. Janet T. Landa, 2016. "“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock, the man and the bioeconomist," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 129-136, July.
  43. Csontos, László, 1997. "A politika tanulmányozása és a közgazdaságtan [The study of politics and political economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 557-568.
  44. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 3-25, March.
  45. William Mitchell, 1988. "Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 101-119, February.
  46. Patrick Welle, 1999. "Public policy and the quality of life: How relevant is economics? Public policy and the quality of life: Market incentives versus government planning Randall G. Holcombe greenwood press, 1995, 190 pp," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 91-113, March.
  47. William Keech & Michael Munger, 2015. "The anatomy of government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 1-42, July.
  48. A. Hamlin, 1984. "Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 133-145, January.
  49. Edward Clarke, 1980. "Incentives in public decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 379-382, January.
  50. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
  51. Rafael Hortalà-Vallvé, 2010. "Qualitative Voting," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 33(92), pages 5-44, Mayo-Sept.
  52. Howard Margolis, 1982. "A thought experiment on demand-revealing mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 87-91, March.
  53. Arthur Schram, 2016. "Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 214-226, June.
  54. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
  55. Matt Essen, 2014. "A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 309-327, August.
  56. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
  57. Gehring, Kai, 2013. "Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 74-90.
  58. Nabamita Dutta & Russell Sobel, 2016. "Does corruption ever help entrepreneurship?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 179-199, June.
  59. Randall G. Holcombe, 2023. "The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 157-167, July.
  60. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2010. "Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 455-470, March.
  61. McKitrick, Ross & Collinge, Robert A., 2002. "The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 106-122, July.
  62. Randall G. Holcombe & Paul C. Taylor, 1980. "Tax Referenda and the Voluntary Exchange Model of Taxation: a Suggested Implementation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 8(1), pages 107-114, January.
  63. Kangas, Annika & Laukkanen, Sanna & Kangas, Jyrki, 2006. "Social choice theory and its applications in sustainable forest management--a review," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 77-92, November.
  64. Pham, Hai-Vu, 2010. "La dimension conflictuelle des projets d’infrastructure : essais sur la décision publique, le contentieux et les prix immobiliers," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5656 edited by Torre, André & Kirat, Thierry.
  65. Howard Margolis, 1983. "A note on demand-revealing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 217-225, January.
  66. Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
  67. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 1996. "A Revelation Approach To Optimal Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(4), pages 439-463, October.
  68. Richard Wallick, 2012. "Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 223-244, July.
  69. Gary Miller & Thomas Hammond, 1994. "Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 5-26, January.
  70. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
  71. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
  72. Timur Kuran, 1987. "Chameleon voters and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 53-78, January.
  73. Charles Laine, 1985. "Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 437-457, January.
  74. Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny, 2007. "Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 197-215, April.
  75. Edward Bierhanzl & Paul Downing, 1998. "User charges and bureaucratic inefficiency," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(2), pages 175-189, June.
  76. E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "The robustness of quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 75-107, July.
  77. Timo Hoffmann & Sander Renes, 2022. "Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 624-655, April.
  78. Roy D. Adams & Ken McCormick, 1993. "The Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Needs to Be Expanded, Not Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 109-116, January.
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