It is to be expected that rational peole defend themselves against pollution externalities, at the very least through spatial separation from the source. Bu even in the simplist models, defensive generates nonconvexities, multiple optima, and inconclusive policy guidance. This calls into question the theory of environmental policy, yet the problem has been largely ignored. This paper derives a sufficient condition for a uniquely optimal emissions level in the presence of defensive activity.
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Paper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
1998-6.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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