Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem
AbstractWhen urban renewal projects require that smaller parcels be assembled into a single large one, owners who hold out for higher prices may either prevent or significantly delay socially efficient redevelopment. Local governments seeking private redevelopment currently have only the choice between either hoping that private bargaining will lead to efficient land assembly or taking the properties of these owners under eminent domain. We describe two mechanisms that solve the holdout problem and lead to efficiency in land assembly without resorting to governmental takings.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-8.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
land assembly; takings; self-assessment;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-PPM-2008-01-05 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-URE-2008-01-05 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:fth:coluec:439 is not listed on IDEAS
- Menezes, Flavio Marques & Pitchford, Rohan, 2001.
"The Land Assembly Problem Revisited,"
Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
427, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-59, December.
- McFarlane, Alastair, 1999. "Taxes, Fees, and Urban Development," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 416-436, November.
- Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2004. "The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl," Working papers 2004-38, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2005. "Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property under Uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 471-495, 08.
- Asami, Yasushi, 1985. "A game-theoretic approach to the division of profits from economic land development," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 233-246, May.
- Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1974.
"Incentives and Public Inputs,"
29, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-62, June.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Horowitz, John K., 2006. "The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 6-11, October.
- Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
- O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1994. "Land assembly and urban renewal," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-300, June.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- Eckart, Wolfgang, 1985. "On the land assembly problem," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 364-378, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Djavad Salehi-Isfahani).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.