When urban renewal projects require that smaller parcels be assembled into a single large one, owners who hold out for higher prices may either prevent or significantly delay socially efficient redevelopment. Local governments seeking private redevelopment currently have only the choice between either hoping that private bargaining will lead to efficient land assembly or taking the properties of these owners under eminent domain. We describe two mechanisms that solve the holdout problem and lead to efficiency in land assembly without resorting to governmental takings.
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Paper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
e07-8.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1974.
"Incentives and Public Inputs,"
Discussion Papers
29, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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