Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Mechanism for Allocating the Expenses of Public Goods: Analyses of a Swedish Government Project

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yang, Der-Yuan
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Bohm (1982) reported a Swedish census project, which used a cost-sharing mechanism giving participants incentives to misrepresent their willingness to pay (WTP), yet still ended up providing a public good. In this paper we offer a theoretical analysis of the mechanism and propose two revisions. In the first revision, the incentives to overstate or understate are randomized, weakening participants’ tendency to misrepresent WTP. Whereas in the second revision, reporting true WTP is participants’ weakly dominant strategy. Our revisions delineate a simple approach to induce true WTP, while the Swedish mechanism can be treated as a special case.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3mx5z1b4.pdf;origin=repeccitec
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt3mx5z1b4.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt3mx5z1b4

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
    Phone: (805) 893-3670
    Fax: (805) 893-8830
    Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/ucsbecon_dwp/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Willingness to Pay.;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    2. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-59, December.
    3. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt3mx5z1b4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.