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The Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Needs to Be Expanded, Not Abandoned

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  • Roy D. Adams
  • Ken McCormick

Abstract

Observations that goods and services cannot legitimately be divided into just two categories - private and public - have led to a proposal, published in this journal, that the traditional concept of public goods be abandoned. In this paper it is suggested that the problems of the private versus public dichotomy be solved by expanding the taxonomy, not by abandoning it. Non-rivalry and non-excludability are independent characteristics (i.e. one can exist without the other), and they can be present in varying degrees (i.e. they are not all-or-nothing characteristics). Recognizing this, an expanded taxonomy is constructed which is not subject to the valid criticisms which have been made of the too simple private versus public dichotomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Roy D. Adams & Ken McCormick, 1993. "The Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Needs to Be Expanded, Not Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 109-116, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:109-116
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005001005
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    Cited by:

    1. Hugo Couderé, 2018. "To Blend or not to Blend: Towards a Belgian Blended Finance Policy," BeFinD Working Papers 0128, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    2. Walter Buhr, 2009. "Infrastructure of the Market Economy," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 132-09, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    3. Ver Eecke, W., 1999. "Public goods: An ideal concept," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 139-156, July.

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