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Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments

Author

Listed:
  • Markus C. Arnold

    (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

  • Eva Ponick

    (Technische Universität Clausthal)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Theoretische Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass der Groves-Mechanismus als Anreizsystenn zur wahrheitsgemäßen Berichterstattung äußerst wünschenswerte Eigenschaften aufweist. So ergibt sich die wahrheitsgemäße Berichterstattung für alle Spieler als Gleichgewicht in dominanten Strategien. Offen ist jedoch, ob sich dieses Gleichgewicht auch unter realen Bedingungen zeigt und ob der Anreizmechanismus — wie von der Theorie vorhergesagt — manipulationsresistent ist. Diesen Fragen wird in einer experimentellen Studie nachgegangen. Dabei wird den Teilnehmern in einem von zwei Treatments die Möglichkeit zur anonymen Kommunikation gegeben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Groves-Mechanismus in keinem der beiden Treatments zu wahrheitsgemäßer Berichterstattung führt. Während dies im Treatment ohne Kommunikation jedoch auf soziale Präferenzen bzw. Schwierigkeiten beim Verständnis des Anreizmechanismus zurückgeführt werden kann, zeigen sich im Kommunikationstreatment stabile Manipulationsstrategien der Teilnehmer bis in die letzte Runde.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03371645
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371645
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C91; D82; G31; J33; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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