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The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes

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Author Info
Bryane Michael (Oxford University)

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Abstract

The “first wave” of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human capital) in anti-corruption. Now it time for these programmes to take into account parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this “knowledge.” This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory-practice gap.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0511009.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 22 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0511009

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: anti-corruption; incentive design; incentive compatibility;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing

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References listed on IDEAS
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  4. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1997. "The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 496-515. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, . "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Working Papers 182, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-79, April.
  7. Rapaczynski, Andrzej, 1996. "The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 87-103, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    Other versions:
  11. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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