The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees

Citations

Cited by:

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19. Oded, Sharon, 2011. "Inducing corporate compliance: A compound corporate liability regime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 272-283.
20. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
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21. Grepperud Sverre, 2020. "Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1-28, November.
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