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Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose S. Penalva-Zuasti, 2005. "On Information Revelation in Private Value Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000520, David K. Levine.
  2. Sophie Bade, 2010. "Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_46, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
  4. Miettinen, Paavo, 2017. "Information acquisition during a descending price auction with asymmetrically informed players," Research Discussion Papers 5/2017, Bank of Finland.
  5. Hugo Hopenhayn & Maryam Saeedi, 2016. "Bidding Dynamics in Auctions," NBER Working Papers 22716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012. "On the optimal number of representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 419-445, December.
  7. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
  8. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart & Filip Matějka, 2017. "Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision‐Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 521-553, March.
  9. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2003. "The One Who Controls the Information Appropriates Its Rents," Discussion Papers 1369, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. , & ,, 2015. "Hidden actions and preferences for timing of resolution of uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  11. Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Nonratifiability of the Cartel Mechanism in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction with Participation Costs," MPRA Paper 41202, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
  12. Shi, Xianwen, 2012. "Optimal auctions with information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
  13. Miettinen, Paavo, 2017. "Information acquisition during a descending price auction with asymmetrically informed players," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2017, Bank of Finland.
  14. Peter Cramton, 2005. "How Best to Auction Oil Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 06oil, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005.
  15. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  16. Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-04157650, HAL.
  17. Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2017. "Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2072-2080, July.
  18. Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
  19. Tian, Guoqiang & Xiao, Mingjun, 2007. "Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 41214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2010.
  20. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-75, September.
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