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Impact evaluation of merger control decisions

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  • Budzinski, Oliver

Abstract

This paper provides a comparative analysis of methods for the empirical ex post evaluation of merger control decisions. It develops a competition-policy oriented framework of assessment criteria for the leading evaluation methods and applies them to structural modeling and simulation, differences-in-differences methods, event studies as well as survey-based methods. It concludes that a method-mix is recommendable, however, under the exclusion of event studies that fail to safeguard a minimum level of reliability of their results. Furthermore, the paper warns against overly optimistic expectations about the effects of systematic impact evaluations of merger decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Impact evaluation of merger control decisions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 75, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:75
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Haji Ali Beigi, Maryam & Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "On the use of event studies to evaluate economic policy decisions: A note of caution," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 80, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    empirical methods of industrial organization; merger control; competition; policy; antitrust decisions; comparative analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
    • C54 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Quantitative Policy Modeling
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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