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Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: The competition policy indexes

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  • Buccirossi, Paolo
  • Ciari, Lorenzo
  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo
  • Vitale, Cristiana

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow crosscountry and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005. -- Ziel dieses Beitrag ist die umfassende Beschreibung von neu entwickelten Indikatoren über die Qualität von wettbewerbspolitischen Systemen: die so genannten „Competition Policy Indexes“ (CPIs). Die CPIs messen die Abschreckungsmerkmale der Wettbewerbspolitik in einem Staat oder, genauer gesagt, in einer Gebietskörperschaft. Unter Wettbewerbspolitik ist hierbei sowohl das Kartellrecht als auch seine Vollstreckung definiert, wobei auch die Fusionskontrolle einbezogen ist. Die CPIs bauen auf „harten“ Daten über die zentralen Merkmale eines wettbewerbspolitischen Regimes auf. Diese werden mit Orientierungswerten verglichen, welche anhand von in der Literatur und Praxis allgemein bewährten Verfahren definiert sind. Schließlich werden sie in Indikatoren zusammengefasst, welche einen internationalen Vergleich über die Zeit erlauben. Diese Indikatoren wurden für eine Stichprobe von 13 OECD Gebietskörperschaften (12 OECD Länder und die Europäische Union) für die Zeitspanne 1995-2005 berechnet.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Competition and Innovation with number SP II 2009-15.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbcin:spii200915

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Keywords: Competition Policy; Indicator; Deterrence; Competition Law;

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References

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  1. Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2000. "Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  2. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, 2000. "Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 226, OECD Publishing.
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
  5. Schinkel, Maarten Pieter & Tuinstra, Jan, 2006. "Imperfect competition law enforcement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1267-1297, November.
  6. Damien J. Neven, 2006. "Competition economics and antitrust in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 21(48), pages 741-791, October.
  7. Maarten Pieter Schinkel, 2007. "Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe," Conferences on New Political Economy, in: Max Albert & Stefan Voigt & Dieter Schmidtchen (ed.), Conferences on New Political Economy, edition 1, volume 24, pages 131-170(4 Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
  8. Stefan Voigt, 2006. "The Economic Effects of Competition Policy Cross Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators," ICER Working Papers 20-2006, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  9. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta, 2005. "Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 472, OECD Publishing.
  10. Paul Conway & Véronique Janod & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2005. "Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 419, OECD Publishing.
  11. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Buccirossi, Paolo & Ciari, Lorenzo & Duso, Tomaso & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Vitale, Cristiana, 2009. "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Impact evaluation of merger control decisions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 75, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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