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Würde eine unabhängige europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde eine bessere Wettbewerbspolitik machen?

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  • Budzinski, Oliver

Abstract

-- This chapter discusses the independence of competition authorities and addresses the question whether an independent European competition authority would perform a better competition policy than the competition office of the European Commission, which is not independent but, instead, integral part of the European government. After summarizing the main general considerations, the chapter defines better competition policy simplifying as avoiding or solving three selected problems of contemporary European competition policy. It finds that two of these three problems are indeed likely to be not existent with an independent competition agency whereas the third problem is not likely to be better solvable by an independent body. Eventually, the chapter addresses a recent proposal to implement an independent Council of European Competition Advisors (CECA) that monitors and evaluates the performance of the European Commission's competition division.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics in its series Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers with number 78.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:78

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  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  2. C. Mantzavinos, 2006. "The institutional-evolutionary antitrust model," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 273-291, November.
  3. Bergman, Mats A. & Jakobsson, Maria & Razo, Carlos, 2003. "An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions," Working Paper Series 2003:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  4. John Conybeare & Dong-Hun Kim, 2010. "Barbarians at the Gates: State Control of Global Mergers and Acquisitions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9), pages 1175-1199, 09.
  5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  6. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "An International Multilevel Competition Policy System," Working Papers 83/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  7. STEPHEN WILKS & LEE McGOWAN, 1995. "Disarming the Commission: The Debate over a European Cartel Office," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 259-273, 06.
  8. John Vickers, 2010. "Central banks and competition authorities: institutional comparisons and new concerns," BIS Working Papers 331, Bank for International Settlements.
  9. Budzinski, Oliver & Kuchinke, Björn A., 2012. "Deal or no deal? Consensual arrangements as an instrument of European competition policy," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 76, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  10. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, 08.
  11. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "International antitrust institutions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 72, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  12. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2004. "Market Response to European Regulation of Business Combinations," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 731-757, December.
  13. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  15. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  16. Motta Massimo & Ruta Michele, 2008. "Mergers and National Champions," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 245-270.
  17. Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "Modernisierung der europäischen Wettbewerbsordnung: Werden die nationalen Wettbewerbspolitiken verdrängt?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200611, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  18. Aigner, Gisela & Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The analysis of coordinated effects in EU merger control: where do we stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 156, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty for Economics and Business Administration.
  19. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "The Effects of Competition Policy on Development�-�Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(8), pages 1225-1248.
  20. Paul Seabright, 2005. "National and European Champions - Burden or Blessing?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(2), pages 52-55, 08.
  21. Stephen Breyer, 2009. "Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages F123-F135, 02.
  22. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  23. Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason"," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200606, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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Cited by:
  1. Budzinski, Oliver & Haji Ali Beigi, Maryam, 2013. "Competition policy agendas for industrializing countries," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 81, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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