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Lobbyismus und Medienwirtschaft - Strategische Beeinflussung von Informationsflüssen

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  • Budzinski, Oliver

Abstract

Der Beitrag analysiert den Zusammenhang von Lobbyismus und Medienwirtschaft auf zwei Ebenen. Erstens werden Medienunternehmen und andere Akteure der Medienwirtschaft als Lobbyisten ihrer Partikularinteressen betrachtet und dabei sowohl auf "klassische" Medien als auch auf datenbasierte Geschäftsmodelle moderner Onlinemedienkonzerne eingegangen. Zweitens werden Medienunternehmen als Instrument von Lobbyismusaktivitäten Dritter analysiert, also als Adressat von lobbyistischen Einflüssen, welche sich den Transmissionskanal Medien zu Nutze machen wollen, um die öffentliche Meinung und die Politik zu beeinflussen. Dies spricht spezielle Aspekte der ökonomischen Theorie des Media Bias an. Insgesamt wird dem Beziehungsgeflecht aus Lobbyismus und Medienwirtschaft in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Literatur zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, so dass viele offene Forschungsfragen bestehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver, 2022. "Lobbyismus und Medienwirtschaft - Strategische Beeinflussung von Informationsflüssen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 162, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2011. "Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 6(3–4), pages 235-274, November.
    2. Thomas, Tobias, 2020. "Zur Rolle der Medien in der Demokratie," Research Papers 12, EcoAustria – Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Zhihao Yu, 2005. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 269-286.
    4. Schnellenbach Jan, 2018. "On the behavioral political economy of regulating fake news," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 68(1), pages 159-178, March.
    5. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    6. Petrova, Maria, 2012. "Mass media and special interest groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 17-38.
    7. Yi Xiang & Miklos Sarvary, 2007. "News Consumption and Media Bias," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 611-628, 09-10.
    8. Francesco Sobbrio, 2014. "The political economy of news media: theory, evidence and open issues," Chapters, in: Francesco Forte & Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra (ed.), A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 13, pages 278-320, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
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    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski, Oliver, 2022. "Regulierung des E-Lending für das Gemeinwohl oder im Sinne der Interessengruppen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 163, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medien; Medienökonomie; Lobbyismus; Politische Ökonomie; Media Bias; Digitalwirtschaft;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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