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Please, marry me!: An experimental study of risking a joint venture

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  • Güth, Werner
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
  • Tjotta, Sigve

Abstract

Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of the two forms of joint venture. Whereas a full engagement relies on more specialization, but makes her more exploitable by the male partner, a low engagement is less productive, but also fairer. More specifically, the random profit of a joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in case of a full engagement whereas demands are determined simultaneously in case of a low engagement. Partners interact anonymously. In the repetition the two partners in a matching group of four participants are exchanged. Our treatment variables are her and his outside option value representing gender specific investments in human capital.

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  • Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Tjotta, Sigve, 1999. "Please, marry me!: An experimental study of risking a joint venture," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,92, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199992
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    1. Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Matthias Sutter & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 2003. "Investment and Bargaining in Joint Ventures: A Family Decision Making Experiment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 323-341, June.
    2. Vital Anderhuba & Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Nadege Marchandd, "undated". "Interpersonal allocation behavior in a household saving experiment," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    3. Leanne Roncolato & Alex Roomets, 2020. "Who will change the “baby?” Examining the power of gender in an experimental setting," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 823-852, September.
    4. Smith, Ian, 2007. "Property division on divorce with inequity aversion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 111-128.
    5. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Heynemann, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2013. "Income Taxation and Labor Supply: An Experiment on Couple's Work Effort," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79735, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Mantei, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2014. "Social Norms or Income Taxation - What Drives Couple's Labor Supply? Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100375, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Hannelore Weck‐Hannemann, 2000. "Frauen in der Ökonomie und Frauenökonomik: Zur Erklärung geschlechtsspezifischer Unterschiede in der Wirtschaft und in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(2), pages 199-220, May.
    8. Melanie Schröder & Norma Burow, 2016. "Couple's Labor Supply, Taxes, and the Division of Housework in a Gender-Neutral Lab," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1593, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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