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Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations

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  • Heiner, Ronald Asher
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
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    Abstract

    The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices better than pure chance), then "conditionally cooperative" Nash equilibria may exist in addition to the "always defect" equilibrium. By "conditionally cooperative" we mean that players do not cooperate because of a behavioral "disposition" to act cooperatively, but cooperate rather selectively contingent on their forecasting of the opponent's cooperation (cooperate if and only if each other is forecasted to cooperate). -- Der Beitrag zeigt, daß Spieler, die in der Lage sind, die Aktionen ihrer Gegenspieler eher richtig als falsch zu prognostizieren, in einer prototypischen Gefangenendilemmasituation einen Anreiz haben, sich kooperativ zu verhalten. Insbesondere wird nachgewiesen, daß es neben dem aus der tradtitionellen Analyse bekannten Ergebnis der allseitigen Defektion auch zu sogenannten "bedingt kooperativen" Nash-Gleichgewichten kommen kann, falls beide Spieler diese Prognosefähigkeit besitzen. Die Spieler kooperieren dabei nicht aufgrund einer Disposition für kooperatives Verhalten, sondern vielmehr selektiv und bedingt auf ihre Vorhersagefähigkeit.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 95-03.

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    Date of creation: 1995
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9503

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    Related research

    Keywords: prisoner's dilemma; reliability condition; forecasting ability; trust;

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    References

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    1. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
    2. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    3. Heiner, Ronald A., 1988. "The necessity of imperfect decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-55, July.
    4. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
    5. Heiner, Ronald A., 1989. "The origin of predictable dynamic behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 233-257, October.
    6. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
    7. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    8. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-95, September.
    9. Guth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9339, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    10. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-80, December.
    11. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December.
    12. Bolle, Friedel & Ockenfels, Peter, 1990. "Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 69-84, March.
    13. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May.
    14. Crawford, Vincent P, 1990. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 213-19, May.
    15. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
    16. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics 97-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "Homo oeconomicus und das Recht," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics 2000-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Max Albert & Ronald A. Heiner, 2003. "An Indirect-Evolution Approad to Newcomb's Problem," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 161-194.

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