This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Selten, Reinhard

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-45822RH-1C/2/800c68b5f67da816e549f6072bb5dc20
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 16 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 223-266
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:16:y:1988:i:3:p:223-266

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, . "Wie Du mir, so ich Dir! - Ökonomische Theorie und Experiment am Beispiel der Reziprozität," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  2. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Discussion Paper 30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:hal:papers:halshs-00275386_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2008-7-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.