Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Werner Güth

    ()

  • Axel Ockenfels

    ()

Abstract

We report on a research program that employs the indirect evolutionary approach to analyze how the institutional environment drives the evolution of trust and trustworthiness through the evolution of moral preferences, and how in turn the evolution of preferences shapes the evolution of the rules of the game. In particular, we describe how the ability to detect trustworthiness in non-anonymous communities supports the evolution of trust and thus crowds out legal institutions. If anonymous interaction prevents type detection, legal institutions such as courts and legal insurance may play a decisive role for the emergence of trust.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2002-07.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2002-07.

as in new window
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena
Phone: +49-3641-68 65
Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90
Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/ESI/discuss.php

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  2. Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series 331, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Max Albert & Erich Kirchler & Werner Güth & Boris Maciejovsky, 2001. "Exploring Behavior: An Ultimatum Experiment," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 353-375.
  4. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Reputationsmechanismen auf Internet-Marktplattformen - Theorie und Empirie -," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-46, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  5. Selten,Reinhard, 1986. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games correction and further development," Discussion Paper Serie A 70, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  7. Brosig, Jeannette, 2002. "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 275-290, March.
  8. Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2000. "An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 90-116, October.
  9. G Th, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 155-174, December.
  10. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Berggren, Niclas & Jordahl, Henrik, 2005. "Free to Trust? Economic Freedom and Social Capital," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 2005:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  2. Wolfgang Leininger & Axel Ockenfels, 2008. "The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2187, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Werner Güth & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER & Loreto LLORENTE ERVITI, 2004. "Quantity Competition under Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2003-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. G Th, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 155-174, December.
  5. Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels & Werner Güth, 2006. "The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness on EBay. An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2006-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karin Richter).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.