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Anti-Teilen in Teams


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  • Kirstein, Roland


Soll der gemeinsam erzeugte Output zwischen den Mitgliedern eines Teams aufgeteilt werden, so kann dies die Anreize aller Mitglieder vermindern, unbeobachtbare Anstrengung zu leisten. Weist die gemeinsame Produktionsfunktion darüber hinaus positive Kreuzableitungen auf, so ist Teamarbeit zwar besonders sinnvoll. Allerdings senkt dann die ineffiziente Anstrengung der anderen Teammitglieder die Grenzproduktivität jedes einzelnen, was die individuell rationale Anstrengung noch weiter reduziert. Der Beitrag schlägt einen simplen Vertrag vor, der diese Probleme löst: Anti-Teilung. Im Rahmen dieses Vertrages hat jedes Teammitglied Aussicht auf den gesamten Teamoutput. Hierzu muß jedes Teammitglied sich verpflichten, einen fixen Betrag zu tragen, der allerdings kleiner ist als der effiziente Output. So implementiert Anti-Teilung allseitige effiziente Anstrengung als ein Nash-Gleichgewicht. Damit dieser Vertrag glaubwürdig ist, muß ein nicht-aktiver Akteur die Rolle des Anti-Teilers übernehmen. Dies kann ein externer Akteur sein, oder aber ein Mitglied des Teams übernimmt diese Rolle (interner Anti- Teiler). Externe Anti-Teilung implementiert das First-Best-Ergebnis, interne Anti-Teilung führt dagegen zu einem niedrigeren Output (der jedoch höher ausfallen kann als unter dem Aufteilungsvertrag). -- Budget balanced sharing rules in Teams decrease the incentive of its members to spend effort. In case of strategic complements, this sharing effect is even stronger. The paper proposes a simple contract that may solve (or, at least: meliorate) this problem: Anti-Sharing. External Anti-Sharing provides an obligation for each team-member to pay a fixed sum to an additional player, the Anti-Sharer, who also receives the team output. He then pays a sum equal to the value of the actual team output to each member of the team. This contract may implement first-best effort. Internal Anti-Sharing puts one of the team members into the position of the Anti-Sharer. He then ceases to spend productive effort. Therefore, this contract cannot implement first-best outcomes. Anti-Sharing is a theory of hierarchies that is not based on command or monitoring, and is related to the theory of strategic moves.

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Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2004-04.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200404

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Keywords: Strategische Komplemente; Teilungsproblem; Anti-Insurance;

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  1. Roland Kirstein, 2000. "Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 251-261, April.
  2. Christoph Lülfesmann, 2000. "Team Production, Sequential Investments and Stochastic Payoffs," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse6_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  4. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics 2002-11, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  5. Jörg Finsinger & Mark V. Pauly, 1990. "The Double Liability Rule*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(2), pages 159-169, September.
  6. Susan I. Cohen & Martin Loeb, 1984. "The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 20-24, January.
  7. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
  8. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-77, August.
  9. Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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