Birds of a Feather : Teams as a Screening Mechanism
AbstractThis paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic principal/multiple-agents framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and choose between working together or separately. We characterize the distributions on agents' types, nature and wages such that teams are formed exclusively by good-type agents, with and without side payments. As employment records matter when idiosyncratic contributions are difficult to isolate, a good-type agent prefers not to jeopardize his reputation by teaming up with a bad-type agent.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique in its series Papers with number 9808.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.
Phone: (418) 656-5122
Fax: (418) 656-2707
Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/
More information through EDIRC
GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; PRODUCTION;
Other versions of this item:
- Breton, M. & St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D., 1998. "Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Papers 98-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-.
- Breton, Michèle & St-Amour, Pascal & Vencatachellum, Désiré, 1998. "Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 9808, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.