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The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment

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Author Info

  • Meyer, M.A.

Abstract

The authors analyze optimal task assignment when a firm needs to learn the abilities of employees. When projects require collaboration between juniors and seniors and only team outputs are observable, having juniors divide their time between two projects (junior sharing) is less informative about their abilities but more informative about their senior teammates' abilities than having juniors devote all their time to a single project (no sharing). In an overlapping-generations model, the authors show that no sharing is more (less) attractive than junior sharing if the prior uncertainty about abilities is small (large) relative to exogenous shocks to team production. Copyright 1994, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics in its series Papers with number 30.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stante:30

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Keywords: economic models ; economic analysis;

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Cited by:
  1. Jan Eeckhout, . "Competing Norms of Cooperation," Penn CARESS Working Papers fa8d3cedc3b97259070110325, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
  3. Nathalie Greenan & Emmanuelle Walkowiak, 2005. "Informatique, organisation du travail et intéractions sociales," Econometrics 0505008, EconWPA.
  4. Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Hartmut Egger & Michael Koch, 2013. "Trade and the Firm-Internal Allocation of Workers to Tasks," Working Papers 139, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  6. Li, Fei & Tian, Can, 2011. "Directed search and job rotation," MPRA Paper 33875, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
  8. E. Carbonara, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Power in Organisations," Working Papers 358, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  9. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2007. "Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality," Working Papers 060713, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  10. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
  11. Heski Bar-Isaac & Juanjo Ganuza, 2005. "Teaching to the top and searching for superstars," Working Papers 05-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2003. "Firms, assignments, and earnings," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 69-81.
  13. Edward S. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2003. "Mechanism design and assignment models," Working Paper 03-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

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