Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs
AbstractThis paper investigates a team production problem where two parties invest sequentially to generate a joint surplus. We find that the first best can be implemented even if the investment return is highly uncertain. The optimal contract entails a basic dichotomy: it is a simple option contract if investments of both parties are substitutive, and a linear incentive contract if they are complementary. These arrangements can be interpreted in terms of asset ownership, and renegotiation arises in equilibrium after the first agent has invested.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 157 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Christoph Lülfesmann, 2000. "Team Production, Sequential Investments and Stochastic Payoffs," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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- Christian Keuschnigg, 2003.
"Optimal Public Policy For Venture Capital Backed Innovation,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003
2003-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Keuschnigg, Christian, 2003. "Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3850, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Anti-Teilen in Teams," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert, 2003.
CSLE Discussion Paper Series
2003-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
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