This paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic agency framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and chooose between working together or separately. We characterize the distributions on agents' types, nature and wages such that teams are formed exclusively by good-type agents, with and without side payments.
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Paper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- in its series Papers with number
98-05.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:etcomo:98-05
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information