Refillable Versus Non-Refillable Containers The Impact Of Regulatory Measures On Packaging Mix And Quality Choices
AbstractWith the continually declining percentage of soft drink sales in refillable bottles in favour of cans and PET bottles, despite a growing soft drink market, governments have become increasingly concerned about the alleged more environmentally harmful impacts of throw-away convenience packaging and tried to enact policies to induce consumers to switch to refillable glass bottles. In many cases, fully or partially refundable deposits have been opted for to provide consumers with the incentive to properly dispose of packaging, but not to switch between different container types, and thus, they may not constitute the most desirable solution. The effects of various regulatory measures on produceers' choices of packaging quality and mix in the presence of consumers with differing demand intensities are therefore analyzed to discern the least distortionary alternative.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1998_03.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1998
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ferrara, Ida & Plourde, Charles, 2003. "Refillable versus non-refillable containers: the impact of regulatory measures on packaging mix and quality choices," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 1-13.
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