Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television
AbstractUsing an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in cable television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities. Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 50 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Crawford, Gregory & Shum, Matthew, 2005. "Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television," Working paper 169, Regulation2point0.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chenghuan Sean Chu, 2008. "The effect of satellite entry on product quality for cable television," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Savage, Ian, 2010. "The dynamics of fare and frequency choice in urban transit," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 815-829, December.
- Benjamin Reed Shiller, 2013. "First Degree Price Discrimination Using Big Data," Working Papers 58, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School, revised Sep 2013.
- Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-29, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Mary T. Kelly & John S. Ying, 2013. "Testing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Competition on Cable Television Rates," Working Papers 13-06, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- Krämer, Jan & Wiewiorra, Lukas, 2009. "Network neutrality and congestion sensitive content providers: Implications for content variety, broadband investment and regulation," MPRA Paper 42519, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Jan 2012.
- Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2010. "Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-27, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- repec:pra:mprapa:42457 is not listed on IDEAS
- Liu, Yizao & Shen, Shu, 2012. "Price Discrimination with Asymmetric Firms: The Case of the U.S. Carbonated Soft Drinks Market," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124619, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.