Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping
AbstractAdditional solid waste disposal imposes resource and environmental costs, but most residents still pay no additional fee per marginal unit of garbage collection. In a simple model with garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options, we show that the optimizing fee for garbage collection equals the resource cost plus environmental cost. When illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option, however, the optimizing fee for garbage collection can change sign. Burning or dumping is not a market activity and cannot be taxed directly, but it can be discouraged indirectly by a system with a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal either through recycling or garbage collection. This optimizing fee structure is essentially a deposit-refund system. The output tax helps achieve the first-best allocation even though it may affect the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure, because consumption leads to disposal problems while leisure does not.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 29 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
Other versions of this item:
- Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman, 1993. "Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping," NBER Working Papers 4374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Copeland, Brian R., 1991. "International trade in waste products in the presence of illegal disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 143-162, March.
- Miedema, Allen K., 1983. "Fundamental economic comparisons of solid waste policy options," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 21-43, March.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1972. "Dynamics of Waste Accumulation: Disposal Versus Recycling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 86(4), pages 600-616, November.
- Lee, Dwight R., 1984. "The economics of enforcing pollution taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 147-160, June.
- Porter, Richard C., 1978. "A social benefit-cost analysis of mandatory deposits on beverage containers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-375, December.
- Ian M. Dobbs, 1991. "Litter and Waste Management: Disposal Taxes versus User Charges," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(1), pages 221-27, February.
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