Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation
AbstractFishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems,that have been tried out, have been short- lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same remuneration principles? The answer offered is that the circumstances under which fishing is conducted play a vital role here. Surveillance of the conduct of employees is almost impossible. Hence, vessel owners must develop some system for motivating workers and to discourage shirking. It is shown that sharing is better than alternative forms of remuneration in that respect. The production unit is a small platform that is not easily abandoned during a trip. The product ofr a given trip is well- defined. All of these factors help to explain the prevalence of sharing in fisheries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Labor and Demography with number 9702002.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 25 Feb 1997
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Remuneration system in fisheries; Contingent Renewal; Skipper Contracts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- L79 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Other
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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