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Cost sharing and catch sharing

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Author Info

  • Thorolfur Matthiasson

    (University of Iceland)

Abstract

The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. In the model a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non- shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/dev/papers/9612/9612002.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 9612002.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 13 Dec 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:9612002

Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect 3.5 for the Mac; prepared on Macintosh; to print on PostScript; pages: 34; figures: none
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Cost sharing; remuneration systems; fishing;

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References

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  1. Dupont, D.P., 1993. "Price Uncertainty,Expectations Formation and Fishers' Allocation Choice," Working Papers 1993-1, Brock University, Department of Economics.
  2. Sutinen, J G, 1979. "Fishermen's Remuneration Systems and Implications for Fisheries Development," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 26(2), pages 147-62, June.
  3. Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. "Sharecropping," Papers 11, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  4. Thorolfur Matthiasson, 1997. "Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation," Labor and Demography 9702002, EconWPA.
  5. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January.
  6. Lee G. Anderson, 1982. "The Share System in Open-Access and Optimally Regulated Fisheries," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(4), pages 435-449.
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Cited by:
  1. McConnell, Kenneth E. & Price, Michael, 2006. "The lay system in commercial fisheries: Origin and implications," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-307, May.
  2. Thorolfur Matthiasson, 1997. "Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation," Labor and Demography 9702002, EconWPA.
  3. Nguyen, Quang, 2009. "choice of remuneration regime in fisheries: the case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries," MPRA Paper 13792, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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