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Sharecropping

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Author Info
STIGLITZ, J.E.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper in its series Papers with number 11.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:priwdp:11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
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Keywords: risk ; incentives;

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Teh, Robert Jr., 1991. "Interlinked Credit and Tenancy Arrangements: A State-of-the-Art Review," Working Papers WP 1991-10, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2004. "Optimal Share Contracts under Theft," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 980, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  3. Islam, Roumeen, 2003. "do more transparent government govern better?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3077, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yasmeen Khwaja, 2002. "Informal Credit Markets, Interlinkage and Migration," Public Policy Discussion Papers 02-23, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1996. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 5585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1989. "Credit rationing, tenancy, productivity, and the dynamics of inequality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 176, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dilip Mookherjee & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2005. "Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor and Inequality," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series DP-155, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Thorolfur Matthiasson, 1996. "Cost sharing and catch sharing," Development and Comp Systems 9612002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 290, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999. "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2134, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Contractual Choice in Tenancy," Departmental Working Papers 199711, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Gray, Cheryl W., 1989. "Legal process and economic development : a case study of Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 350, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 1566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Yasmeen Khwaja, 2002. "Informal Credit Markets, Interlinkage and Migration," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 02-23, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
  19. Eugene White, 2001. "France's Slow Transition from Privatized to Government-Administered Tax Collection: Tax Farming in the Eighteenth Century," Departmental Working Papers 200116, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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