Sharecropping
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper in its series Papers with number 11.Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:priwdp:11
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: risk ; incentives;References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005.
"Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor And Inequality,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2005-035, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2005. "Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor and Inequality," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series DP-155, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf, 2006. "Bankruptcy law, bonded labor and inequality," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 18, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 2000.
"Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 445-462, August.
- Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999. "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2134, The World Bank.
- Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1996.
"The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data,"
NBER Working Papers
5585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
- Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1989. "Credit rationing, tenancy, productivity, and the dynamics of inequality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 176, The World Bank.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2005.
"Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
- Matthiasson, Thorolfur, 1999.
"Cost sharing and catch sharing,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, February.
- Thorolfur Matthiasson, 1996. "Cost sharing and catch sharing," Development and Comp Systems 9612002, EconWPA.
- Islam, Roumeen, 2003. "do more transparent government govern better?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3077, The World Bank.
- Yasmeen Khwaja, 2002. "Informal Credit Markets, Interlinkage and Migration," Public Policy Discussion Papers 02-23, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, EconWPA.
- John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 290, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Contractual Choice in Tenancy," Departmental Working Papers 199711, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Eugene White, 2001. "France's Slow Transition from Privatized to Government-Administered Tax Collection: Tax Farming in the Eighteenth Century," Departmental Working Papers 200116, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January.
- Gray, Cheryl W., 1989. "Legal process and economic development : a case study of Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 350, The World Bank.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 1566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yasmeen Khwaja, 2002. "Informal Credit Markets, Interlinkage and Migration," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 02-23, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
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