This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Witold J. Henisz ()
Bennet A. Zelner ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of 78 countries during the period 1970 – 1994. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions and construction firms; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp711.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 2004-711.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-711

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 724 E. University Ave. Wyly Hall, Floor 1, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1234
Phone: 734 615 4566
Fax: (734) 763-5850
Email:
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Patricia Loh).

Related research
Keywords: Electricity Institutional Environment Investment Regulation interest group state owned enterprise

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises
F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
    Other versions:
  2. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire Them," NBER Working Papers 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Milner, Helen V & Yoffie, David B, 1989. "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 43(2), pages 239-72, Spring.
  4. Juliet D'souza & William L. Megginson, 1999. "The Financial and Operating Performance of Privatized Firms during the 1990s," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1397-1438, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio López-De-Silanes, 1999. "The Benefits Of Privatization: Evidence From Mexico," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1193-1242, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Cadot, Olivier & Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stephan, Andreas, 1999. "A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 48(4), pages 595-632, Autumn.
  10. Oliner, Stephen & Rudebusch, Glenn & Sichel, Daniel, 1995. "New and Old Models of Business Investment: A Comparison of Forecasting Performance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 806-26, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  12. Mansfield, Edward D & Busch, Marc L, 1995. "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 49(4), pages 723-49, Autumn.
  13. Ugo Panizza, 2001. "Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 311-342, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G., 2000. "On the formation of industry lobby groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 315-335, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
    Other versions:
  23. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
  24. Artana, Daniel & Navajas, Fernando & Urbiztondo, Santiago, 2001. "Regulation policies towards utilities and competitive industries. The case of Argentina," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 585-607. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephane Straub, 2008. "Infrastructure and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Advances and Research Challenges," ESE Discussion Papers 179, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin, 2004. "Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp733, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Aghassi Mkrtchyan, 2004. "Impact Of Regulated Price Adjustments On Price Variability In A Very Low Inflation Transition Economy: Case Of Armenia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp731, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-20.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.