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Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

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  • Ugo Panizza

Abstract

This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality. Copyright 2001 Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics and Politics.

Volume (Year): 13 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 311-342

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:311-342

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Cited by:
  1. Brown, David S. & Touchton, Michael & Whitford, Andrew, 2011. "Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1516-1529, September.
  2. Stéphane Straub, 2000. "Empirical Determinants of Good Institutions: Do We Know Anything?," IDB Publications 6471, Inter-American Development Bank.
  3. Stéphane Straub, 2000. "Factores determinantes empíricos de las buenas instituciones: ¿sabemos algo a ciencia cierta?," Research Department Publications 4216, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  4. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza, 2002. "Las reformas estructurales en América Latina bajo la lupa," Research Department Publications 4302, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  5. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2004. "Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-711, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  6. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Empirical Survey on the Causes of the Corruption
    [Aperçu empirique sur les causes de la corruption]
    ," MPRA Paper 41484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Political Particularism around the World," IDB Publications 6494, Inter-American Development Bank.
  8. Alberto Melo, 2003. "Colombia: Los problemas de competitividad de un país en conflicto," Research Department Publications 1002, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  9. Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012. "Immunity," Working Papers 12-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    • Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta, 2013. "Immunity," CESifo Working Paper Series 4445, CESifo Group Munich.
    • Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta, 2013. "Immunity," Working Papers 13-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza, 2002. "Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny," Research Department Publications 4301, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  11. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  12. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Particularismo político alrededor del mundo," Research Department Publications 4290, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  13. Vatcharin Sirimaneetham, 2006. "What drives liberal policies in developing countries?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/587, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  14. Alberto Chong & Alejandro Izquierdo & Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, 2003. "Conducción empresarial y flujos de capitales privados hacia América Latina," Research Department Publications 4324, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  15. Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2005. "Consequences and causes of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-34-05, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  16. Alberto Chong & Alejandro Izquierdo & Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Private Capital Flows to Latin America," Research Department Publications 4323, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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