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Privatisation and Institutions: A Cross Country Analysis Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Bernardo Bortolotti
Domenico Siniscalco ()
Marcella Fantini
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Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 375.
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Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
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Keywords: Keywords: Privatisation ; politics ; budget deficit ; investor protection ; enforcement of law ; capital markets JEL Classification: L33 ; D72 ; G15 ; H6 ; K22 ; Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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