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Can guest worker schemes reduce illegal migration ?

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Author Info
Amin, Mohammad
Mattoo, Aaditya

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Abstract

The authors analyze recent efforts at international cooperation to limit illegal migration, particularly through the use of legal migration avenues like guest worker schemes. They show that while guest worker schemes may be desirable as an avenue of international migration, they are an inefficient instrument to induce cooperation on illegal migration. On the one hand, guest worker schemes suffer from a negative selection problem relative to illegal migration, which tends to erode their attractiveness to source countries. On the other hand, guest worker schemes increase total (legal and illegal) migration which make them a costly compensating device for the host country. Moreover, guest worker schemes create additional pressure on host countries to implement tough laws against illegal immigration even when the host finds such laws undesirable. Thus, less favorable treatment of illegal immigrants, as in California Proposition 187, may be an inevitable rather than incidental outcome of reliance on guest worker schemes. In contrast, countries that are willing to use transfers and other forms of economic assistance to induce source countries to cooperate can afford relatively liberal treatment of illegal immigrants.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3828.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3828

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Related research
Keywords: Gender and Social Development; Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement; Anthropology; Human Migrations&Resettlements; Gender and Development;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chiswick, Barry R, 1988. "Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 101-15, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Myers, Gordon M. & Papageorgiou, Yorgos Y., 2000. "Immigration control and the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 183-207, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," Microeconomics 9705002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pia M. Orrenius, 2001. "Illegal immigration and enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border; an overview," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q I, pages 2-11. [Downloadable!]
  5. Chau, Nancy H, 2001. "Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 604-34, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jones, Stephen R. G., 1989. "Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 159-174, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  8. Gaytan-Fregoso, Helena & Lahiri, Sajal, 2000. "Foreign aid and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 515-527, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 258-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1337-1357, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão, 2004. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 10375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Drazen, Allan & Limão, Nuno, 2003. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4007, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Joseph Zweimuller & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 1995. "Immigration, Trade and Austrian Unemployment," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1090, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Chiswick, Barry R., 2000. "Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected? An Economic Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 131, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Toman Omar Mahmoud & Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Economic Drivers of Human Trafficking: Micro-Evidence from Five Eastern European Countries," Kiel Working Papers 1480, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hoekman, Bernard & Ozden, Caglar, 2009. "The Euro-mediterranean partnership : trade in services as an alternative to migration ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5049, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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