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Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement

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Author Info
Gordon H. Hanson
Antonio Spilimbergo

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the correlation between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the United States, the U.S. government's main policy instrument for combating illegal immigration. We see whether border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that are intensive in the use of undocumented labour, as would be consistent with political economy models of illegal immigration. We find that border enforcement is negatively correlated with lagged relative price changes in the apparel, fruits and vegetables, and livestock industries and with housing starts in western United States, suggesting that authorities relax border enforcement when demand for undocumented labour is high.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 612-638
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:34:y:2001:i:3:p:612-638

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Richard B. Freeman, 1982. "Crime and the Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 1031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Djajic, Slobodan, 1987. "Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 235-249, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Djajic, Slobodan, 1997. "Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 97-117, February.
  6. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1337-1357, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Godfrey, L G, 1994. "Testing for Serial Correlation by Variable Addition in Dynamic Models Estimated by Instrumental Variables," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 550-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 1999. "A Theory of Unilateralism and Reciprocity in Trade Policy," Working Papers 99-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Sapir, Andre, 1983. "Foreign competition, immigration and structural adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 381-394, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rafael Tenorio & Gabriella A. Bucci, 1996. "On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-81.
  12. George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman & Kevin Lang, 1991. "Undocumented Mexican-born Workers in the United States: How Many, How Permanent?," NBER Chapters, in: Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market, pages 77-100 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Manuela Angelucci, 2005. "U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 1642, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Gordon H. Hanson, 2006. "Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States," NBER Working Papers 12141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Anna Maria Mayda, 2007. "International migration: A panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0707, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sudeshna Bandyopadhyay, 2006. "The role of capital mobility in illegal immigration policy," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 173-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2004. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting," NBER Working Papers 10826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Giuseppe Russo, 2008. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2008_14, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Maria Concetta Chiuri & Giuseppe De Arcangelis & Giovanni Ferri, . "Crisis in the Country of Origin and Illegal Immigration Into Europe via Italy," Working Papers 77, Sapienza University of Rome, CIDEI. [Downloadable!]
  8. de Melo, Jaime & Grether, Jean-Marie & Müller, Tobias, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Angel García, 2006. "Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 649-670, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Francesco Magris & Giuseppe Russo, 2004. "Voting on mass immigration restriction," DELTA Working Papers 2004-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  11. Maurice Kugler, . "Migrant Remittances, Human Capital Formation and Job Creation Externalities in Colombia," Borradores de Economia 370, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda & Prachi Mishra, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2008. "Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March. [Downloadable!]
  15. ?gel Solano Garc?, 2004. "Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 614.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  16. Alessandra Venturini & Riccardo Faini, 2008. "Development and Migration: Lessons from Southern Europe," CHILD Working Papers wp10_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
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