This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hanson, G.H.
Spilimbergo, A.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the correlation between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the United States. Enforcement of national borders is the main policy instrument the U.S. government uses to combat illegal immigration. The motivation for the exercise is to see whether border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that are intensive in the use of undocumented labor, as would be consistent with political economy models of how enforcement policy against illegal immigration is determined. The main finding is that border enforcement is negatively correlated with lagged relative price changes in the apparel, fruits and vegetables, and slaughtered livestock industries and with housing starts in the western United States. This suggests that authorities relax border enforcement when the demand for undocumented workers is high.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan in its series Working Papers with number 449.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:449

Contact details of provider:
Postal: ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN 48109
Web page: http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (FSPP Webmaster).

Related research
Keywords: IMMIGRATION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General
J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Richard B. Freeman, 1982. "Crime and the Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 1031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Djajic, Slobodan, 1987. "Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 235-249, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Djajic, Slobodan, 1997. "Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 97-117, February.
  6. Godfrey, L G, 1994. "Testing for Serial Correlation by Variable Addition in Dynamic Models Estimated by Instrumental Variables," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 550-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1337-1357, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 1999. "A Theory of Unilateralism and Reciprocity in Trade Policy," Working Papers 99-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  11. Sapir, Andre, 1983. "Foreign competition, immigration and structural adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 381-394, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rafael Tenorio & Gabriella A. Bucci, 1996. "On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-81.
  13. George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman & Kevin Lang, 1991. "Undocumented Mexican-born Workers in the United States: How Many, How Permanent?," NBER Chapters, in: Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market, pages 77-100 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Russo, Giuseppe, 2008. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," MPRA Paper 6845, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2008. "Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sudeshna Bandyopadhyay, 2006. "The role of capital mobility in illegal immigration policy," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 173-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. de Melo, Jaime & Grether, Jean-Marie & Müller, Tobias, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda & Prachi Mishra, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Anna Maria Mayda, 2007. "International migration: A panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0707, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Manuela Angelucci, 2005. "U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 1642, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Francesco Magris & Giuseppe Russo, 2004. "Voting on mass immigration restriction," DELTA Working Papers 2004-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  9. ?gel Solano Garc?, 2004. "Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 614.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  10. Maurice Kugler, . "Migrant Remittances, Human Capital Formation and Job Creation Externalities in Colombia," Borradores de Economia 370, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gordon H. Hanson, 2006. "Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States," NBER Working Papers 12141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Maria Concetta Chiuri & Giuseppe De Arcangelis & Giovanni Ferri, . "Crisis in the Country of Origin and Illegal Immigration Into Europe via Italy," Working Papers 77, Sapienza University of Rome, CIDEI. [Downloadable!]
  14. Angel García, 2006. "Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 649-670, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Alessandra Venturini & Riccardo Faini, 2008. "Development and Migration: Lessons from Southern Europe," CHILD Working Papers wp10_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
  16. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2004. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting," NBER Working Papers 10826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.