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Governance and economic growth

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  • Gradstein, Mark
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    Abstract

    Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. The extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. The author integrates the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), he presents a model where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other.Initial conditions determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or a low-income steady state. Existing empirical evidence offers tentative support for this theory.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3098.

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    Date of creation: 31 Jul 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3098

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    Keywords: Judicial System Reform; Labor Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Common Property Resource Development; Economic Theory&Research; Inequality; Common Property Resource Development; Environmental Economics&Policies; Governance Indicators;

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    9. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
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    15. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
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    18. Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "Investment, property rights and political instability: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1317-1341, July.
    19. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Governance matters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2196, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:
    1. Chou, Yuan K., 2006. "Three simple models of social capital and economic growth," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 889-912, October.

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