Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pierre Dehez
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which he only stated the axioms. The present paper offers a proof of Shapley's statement as well as an alternative set of axioms. It is shown that the value is the unique rule that allocates additional fixed costs fairly: only the players who are concerned contribute to the fixed cost and they contribute in proportion to their weights. A particular attention is given to the case where some players are assigned a zero weight.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/productions/publications/2011/2011-03.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2011-03.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-03

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la Forêt-Noire 67000 Strasbourg
    Phone: +33 3 68 85 20 69
    Fax: +33 3 68 85 20 70
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: cost allocation; Shapley value; fixed cost.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. René van den Brink, 2002. "An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 309-319.
    2. Thierry Burger-Helmchen & Laurence Frank, 2011. "La création de rentes : une approche par les compétences et capacités dynamiques," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2011-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Pierre Dehez, 2011. "Allocation Of Fixed Costs: Characterization Of The (Dual) Weighted Shapley Value," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(02), pages 141-157.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Dehez, Pierre & Ferey, Samuel, 2013. "How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 44-50.
    2. Radzik, Tadeusz, 2012. "A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 407-416.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.